In tr o d u c tio n 1
To enable the Federal Reserve to change the aggregate supply of the monetary base and, thereby, the aggregate quantities of money and credit and the level of interest rates, the Federal Reserve Act (the "Act") authorizes the Federal Reserve to extend discount window loans and to conduct open market oper ations.2 The Federal Reserve generally has not found it necessary to use all of this authority in order to implement monetary policy effectively. For ex ample, the Federal Reserve does not currently use its open market authority to purchase bills of exchange or bankers' acceptances. Similarly, in certain circumstances, the Federal Reserve has the legal authority to make loans directly to nondepository institutions, but this authority has not been used for more than 60 years.
In this paper, we examine the restrictions imposed by the Act on the Fed eral Reserve's open market operations and discount window lending.3 One restriction the Federal Reserve faces concerns whether its counterparty in a monetary policy action must be a depository institution or may be a nondepos itory institution or an individual. The Federal Reserve also faces restrictions on the types of financial instruments that it may buy and sell in open market operations and accept as collateral for discount window loans. A further im plication of the restrictions of the Act and the apparent Congressional intent may be that the Federal Reserve also faces limitations on the credit risk that it may take onto its balance sheet.
While the restrictions in the Act do not seem to have impaired the conduct of monetary policy in recent decades, there have been two occasions in recent years in which the Federal Reserve felt a need to examine these restrictions. One occasion was the prospect of ongoing federal budget surpluses in the 1990s and the potential paying off of the federal debt.4 The second occasion was in http://www.bepress.com/bejm/topics/vol5/iss1/art6 2003 and 2004 when the Federal Reserve pushed the target federal funds rate to one percent.5
Although this paper focuses on the restrictions in the Act, it is part of the broader literature that considers the composition of assets held by central banks. Bernanke et al. (2004) considers whether purchases of longer-term U.S. Treasury debt by the Federal Reserve could affect the Treasury yield curve through portfolio rebalancing effects. Bernanke (2003) addresses the reluctance by the Bank of Japan to purchase longer-term Japanese government debt due to its concerns about future capital losses. The effects of capital gains and losses on the conduct of monetary policy has been examined in the context of the zero bound by Jeanne and Svensson (2004) .6 In attempting to provide stimulus at the zero bound, the Bank of Japan has purchased stock shares held by commercial banks and asset-backed securities-in both cases, accepting private-sector credit risk onto its balance sheet.7 Bringing credit risk onto the central bank's balance sheet and out of the market could potentially be stimulative when interest rates on assets that are free of credit risk (such as government debt) are near zero but credit-risk premiums are not. But such actions may have the undesirable effect of having the central bank affect the allocation of credit across sectors of the economy and relative asset prices.
To preview; in terms of counterparties, the Federal Reserve faces far fewer statutory restrictions if its counterparty is a depository institution, rather than an individual or nondepository institution, when it is making a discount win dow loan. But when conducting open market operations, it is equally easy (from a legal point of view) for the Federal Reserve to transact with a nonde pository institution or individual as it is to transact with a depository institu tion. Indeed, the Federal Reserve currently conducts open market operations exclusively with about 25 so-called primary government security dealers. All but one of the primary dealers are nondepository institutions, although some are subdivisions of bank holding companies.
In terms of the types of financial instruments with which the Federal Re serve may conduct monetary policy, securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S. Treasury or by federal agencies can be used both in open market operations and as collateral in discount window loans extended to depository institutions and to individuals, partnerships and corporations (IPCs), for example.8
However, the use of private-sector credit instruments is substantially more restricted than is the use of Treasury securities-both in making loans and especially in open market operations. In making loans; if the loan is to a depository institution, a wide variety of private-sector financial instruments can be used as collateral if the loan takes the form of an advance.9 But if the loan takes the form of a discount of third-party paper, any private-sector credit instrument that is discounted must have been issued originally to meet "real bills" criteria.10
Hackley (1973) describes the "real bills" doctrine, saying:
... the Board expounded the principle that all paper offered for discount should be essentially self-liquidating; in other words, that it "should represent in every case some distinct step in the production or distribution process-the progression of goods from producer to consumer." It was not long before this philosophy-the real-bills doctrine-underwent drastic erosion. (p. 191) See West (1977) chapter 7 for a discussion of the real bills doctrine as providing the the oretical background for the Federal Reserve Act and chapter 9 for a view of the Federal Reserve's gradual abandonment of the real bills doctrine. Also see Report of the System Committee on Eligible Paper (1962) , pages 68-69, for a characterization of Section 13(2) as reflecting the "real bills" doctrine.
When using "real bills" in characterizing aspects of the Federal Reserve Act, we will be using it to include agricultural paper, and therefore applying it to paper issued for "agricultural, industrial, or commercial purpose" as per Section 13(2) of the Federal Reserve Act.
In a loan to an IPC, a wide variety of private-sector credit instruments can be discounted (without regard to "real bills" restrictions), but such loans with private-sector instruments serving as collateral are authorized only in "unusual and exigent circumstances" and when the IPC is unable to secure credit from other sources.
In open market operations, the Act's restrictions are on the form of privatesector instruments-they must be bankers' acceptances or bills of exchange (with some further "real bills" restrictions).11 There is no express provision in the Act for the Federal Reserve to use its open-market authority to purchase private-sector promissory notes such as mortgages or corporate bonds or to purchase equities.12
With regards to credit risk potentially acquired through the making of loans, the Federal Reserve seems to be implicitly limited in the private-sector credit risk that it can accept onto its balance sheet because loans to depository institutions must be collateralized.13 1 4 1 5 In asset purchases, the credit risk that the Federal Reserve can take onto its balance sheet seems to be limited only by the restrictions on the types of assets it can purchase-discussed below. But even if the Federal Reserve could take significant nondepository credit risk onto its balance sheet, there could be a host of problems if the Federal Reserve began to evaluate credit risk and if its pricing based on those evaluations affected the allocation of credit in the economy.
The Act provides some flexibility for the Federal Reserve to respond to eco nomic stress through its "incidental powers" provision, although this power is limited to being used only when "necessary to carry on the business of bank ing within the limitations prescribed by this Act" as stated in Section 4(4), paragraph "seventh" of the Federal Reserve Act.14,15 Under this authority, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York wrote options in advance of the 1999 year-end in order to promote smooth functioning of money markets in light of potential Y2K pressures even though the Act does not explicitly give the Federal Reserve the authority to buy and sell options.
While the focus of this paper is on the Federal Reserve Act and other statu tory provisions in their current forms, we provide some historical perspective on how the current powers of the Federal Reserve came to be authorized. Following the historical pattern in which each tool was the dominant tool of monetary policy, we first focus on the authorization of the Federal Reserve to extend loans (Section 2) and then on the authorization to conduct open market operations (Section 3). The "incidental powers" authority and the use of options are discussed in Section 4.
D isco u n t W in d o w Loans

H isto r ic a l O v erv iew
The Federal Reserve Act, passed in 1913, states that the Federal Reserve System was established:
To provide for the establishment of Federal reserve banks, to fur nish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commer cial paper, to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and for other purposes.16
In this preamble, the mention of rediscounting commercial paper conveys two key aspects of how the writers of the Act foresaw the Federal Reserve conduct ing monetary policy in general and discount window lending in particular.17 First, the term "rediscounting" presumes that the Federal Reserve would be dealing with member banks but not directly with the public.18 Commercial paper would be "discounted" by member banks in the first instance and then "rediscounted" by the Federal Reserve.19 Second, given the meaning of "com mercial paper" at the time of the writing of the Act, the reference to com mercial paper indicates that the instruments rediscounted would have been issued for "real bills" purposes-i.e. for "agricultural, industrial, or commer cial purposes" and not "covering merely investments or ... for the purpose of carrying or trading in stocks, bonds, or other investment securities."20 20See Section 13(2) of the Federal Reserve Act. Two definitions of commercial paper are provided by Woelfel (1994) on page 224:
All classes of short-term negotiable instruments (notes, bills, and acceptances) that arise out of commercial, as distinguished from speculative, investment, real estate, personal, or public transactions; short-term notes, bills of ex change, and acceptances arising out of industrial, agricultural, or commercial transactions, the essential qualities of which are short-term maturity (three to six months), automatic or self-liquidating nature, and nonspeculativeness in origin and purpose of use. ... In the narrower, technical sense, commercial paper consists of notes matur ing in less than one year (usually four to six months) which are the direct obligations of issuing mercantile or industrial corporations or copartnerships.
The meaning of "commercial paper" in the Act is closer to the first definition, whereas current usage is more in line with the second definition. Willis and Steiner (1926) , chapter VII, gives a detailed discussion of the practical problems in implementing these "real bills" restrictions.
These provisions are formalized in Section 13(2) of the Act, which states:
Upon the indorsement of any of its member banks, which shall be deemed a waiver of demand, notice and protest ... any Fed eral reserve bank may discount notes, drafts, and bills of exchange arising out of actual commercial transactions; that is notes, drafts, and bills of exchange issued or drawn for agricultural, industrial, or commercial purposes, or the proceeds of which have been used, or are to be used, for such purposes ... but such definition shall not include notes, drafts, or bills covering merely investments or issued or drawn for the purpose of carrying or trading in stocks, bonds, or other investment securities, except bonds and notes of the government of the United States.21
With notes, drafts, and bills of exchange including most types of written credit instruments (as discussed below in Section 3.4), Reed (1922) summarized Section 13(2) of the Act as giving the Federal Reserve the authority:
to discount any of the following: "notes, drafts, and bills of ex change arising out of actual commercial transactions." Eligible paper was to depend, therefore, upon the nature of the underlying transaction and not upon the form of the paper.22
22See Reed (1922) (p. 110) . Also see Willis and Steiner (1926) (p. 147) . Harris (1933) states the same view on page 271, and on page 296 goes on to say:
The objective of introducing eligibility provisions in the Federal Reserve Act was to conserve the resources of the reserve banks for commercial purposes and to influence the lending policies of members so that they would hold the maximum possible supplies of acceptable or eligible paper.
Hardy (1932) also notes that:
It was hoped by some critics of our pre-war banking organization that the Federal Reserve System would bring about a change in the standards of commercial bank lending. ... Standards of eligibility would tend to become standards of lending practice (p. 264).
These restrictions on lending were loosened considerably during the Great Depression when the Federal Reserve was granted authority in 1932 to extend advances under Section 10B of the Act.23
23 Regarding the technical distinctions between discounts of third-party paper for member banks and advances to member banks, Hackley (1973) states:
Both discounts and advances are sometimes loosely referred to as discount operations, but the legal distinctions between the two are clear. In the case of a [Section 13(2)] discount, credit is given by a Reserve Bank to a member bank on the basis of eligible paper representing loans made by the member bank to its own customers. ... Any such eligible paper that is offered for discount is transferred to the Reserve Bank with the member bank's endorsement. No note is executed by the member bank. ... An advance is a simpler operation. The member bank merely executes its own note or, under procedures established in 1971, enters into a continuing lending agreement, and pledges [eligible collateral]. ... If the advance is not repaid at maturity, the Reserve Bank has a direct claim against the member and does not have to resort to the paper pledged as security unless necessary to satisfy that claim (p. 83).
As noted by McKinley (1960):
The discount process is more complicated (one of the reasons it is so little used today) because the instruments signed by customers of the member bank have to be accounted for in detail; and must be returned to the member bank, with other collateral substituted, just prior to the various due dates (p. 94).
While Hackley and McKiney refer to member banks, under Section 19(b)(7) of the Act (adopted in 1980), "Any depository institution in which transactions accounts or nonper sonal time deposits are held shall be entitled to the same discount and borrowing privileges as member banks."
The collateral for such advances was not restricted by "real bills" considerations or to be U.S. Treasury debt, but only had to be "to the satisfaction of [ I P C s 4 : 13(3) Discounts Notes, drafts, and bills of exchange "indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction" of the Reserve Bank, in "unusual and exigent circumstances" and subject to other restrictions.
1. Section 10A provides for advances to groups of member banks, in limited cases. 2. Advances are subject to capitalization standards listed in Section 10B. 3. Must have been endorsed by a member bank. 4. Depository institutions are corporations and thus part of IPCs. Notes: Maturity restrictions apply to all advances (but not the collateral) except those under Section 10A and to collateral for discounts except those under Sections 13(3) and 13(4). However, under Section 13(4) the Federal Reserve may not hold the discounted instrument for more than ninety days. Section 13(14) authorizes advances and discounts to branches and agencies of foreign banks, subject to restrictions.
The Federal Reserve's broadest authority to extend loans to depositories is under Section 10B. The only restriction on the collateral under that au thority is that the Reserve Bank making the advance deems the collateral to be satisfactory.27 The collateral may be promissory notes, such as corporate bonds, short-term corporate paper, or commercial or industrial loans; all of which are instruments that the Federal Reserve cannot purchase or sell under its open market authority (See Section 3.3 below.). Reserve Banks currently accept as collateral various types of promissory notes of acceptable quality, including state and local government securities, mortgages covering one-to four-family residences, credit-card receivables, other customer notes, commer cial mortgages, and business loans. In recent decades, the Federal Reserve has extended credit to depositories only through advances (under Sections 10B and 13 (8)) and has not made any discounts.28
Even though the Federal Reserve can extend credit to depositories through advances secured by a wide array of instruments, the Federal Reserve takes the credit risk of the collateral onto its balance sheet only to a limited extent. With an advance, the loan to the depository is extended on the basis of a promissory note issued by the depository.29 During the course of the advance, should the value of the collateral become insufficient to cover the loan repayment, the Federal Reserve would look to the depository to pledge additional collateral or reduce its loan balance: The depository therefore retains the credit-risk of the collateral.30
30 To further protect itself against credit risk, the Reserve Bank takes a "haircut" on the collateral by giving an advance that is significantly less than the value of the collateral. Then should the depository institution default, the Reserve Bank has a cushion that helps protect it in recouping the full value of the loan.
Additionally, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDI-CIA), through its "prompt corrective action" provisions, has imposed restrictions on depos itory institutions in weak capital conditions. Among those restrictions:
are limitations on access to the Federal Reserve's discount window. Since De cember 1993, FDICIA has limited the ability of the Federal Reserve to provide credit for undercapitalized and critically undercapitalized institutions. FDI CIA stipulates that the Federal Reserve may not lend to an undercapitalized institution for more than 60 days in any 120-day period without incurring a potential limited liability to the FDIC; exceptions to this rule arise if the bor rower's primary federal supervisor certifies in writing that the institution is viable or if the Board conducts its own examination of the borrower and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board certifies that it is viable.
See The Federal Reserve System Purposes and Functions (1994) (p. 52). For critically undercapitalized institutions, the Board incurs a potential limited liability to the FDIC for increases in discount window advances beyond a 5-day period beginning on the date the institution becomes critically undercapitalized. See Clouse (1994) (p. 975). Also, under Section 4(8) of the Federal Reserve Act, Federal Reserve Banks shall give consideration to "undue use" of discount-window credit by banks.
In a discount of third-party paper for a depository institution, although the depository does not issue its own promissory note, the depository must endorse the paper that is discounted.31 31Discounts under Sections 13(2), 13(4) and 13A require an endorsement that is deemed to be a "waiver of demand, notice and protest." Hackley states:
... a borrowing member bank, by virtue of its endorsement of the discounted paper, becomes primarily liable to the Reserve Bank, thus giving the Re serve Bank the right to proceed directly against the member bank rather than against the obligor on the paper discounted. So here too, as in the case of an advance, the credit risk of the underlying collateral stays with the depository institution.
If the credit risk of the collateral remains with the depository, Federal Reserve lending to depositories would likely do very little to lower the creditrisk premiums charged by depositories in making new loans to private-sector borrowers. Such credit risk premiums could be a major factor holding down credit expansion and economic recovery should nominal rates on Treasury bills be at or near zero and should the economy be weak.
L en d in g t o In d iv id u a ls, P a r tn e r sh ip s an d C o rp o ra tio n s
The Federal Reserve has the authority to lend directly to individuals, partner ships, and corporations (IPCs)-which could include depository institutionsunder Sections 13(3) and 13 (13) Because IPCs with such collateral could easily sell it in the open market, Section 13(13) advances may not have much effect (unless done at subsidized rates) in stimulating aggregate demand. In contrast, private-sector instruments may lack the liquidity of Treasury debt. Therefore, Federal Reserve loans to nondepository entities that use such instruments as collateral may provide liquidity for those instruments and could help remove a potential impediment to economic recovery if depository institutions had become unwilling or very reluctant to provide credit. Hence, we shall focus on Section 13(3) discounts of:
... notes, drafts, and bills of exchange when such notes, drafts, and bills of exchange are indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfac tion of the Federal Reserve bank.34
Because notes, drafts, and bills of exchange include most forms of credit instruments, or at least appear to have done so at the time the Act was drafted, Section 13(3) provides virtually no restrictions on the form a written credit instrument must take in order to be eligible for discount.35 And by requiring merely that the discount be "secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank," Section 13(3) of the Act imposes no restrictions on the use of funds (such as for "real bills" purposes) for which the discounted instrument was originally issued.
However, in making Section 13(3) loans to IPCs, the Federal Reserve must impose some standards that are much more stringent in comparison to those imposed in lending to a depository. Two particular requirements are that (1) such lending to IPCs is authorized only in "unusual and exigent circumstances" and that (2) the IPC is not able to "secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking institutions." Activation of this authority requires the affirmative vote "of not less than five members" of the Federal Reserve Board.36
Section 13(3) requires the collateral to be "indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank." Hackley (1973) states:
... it seems clear that it was the intent of Congress that loans should be made only to creditworthy borrowers; in other words, the Reserve Bank should be satisfied that a loan under this authority would be repaid in due course, either by the borrower or by resort to security or the endorsement of a third party.37
Under this interpretation, the endorsement restriction in Section 13(3) could significantly curtail the potential effectiveness of using loans to IPCs to stimulate aggregate demand. In an environment of a sluggish economy and elevated credit risk premiums, lending only to creditworthy IPCs or accepting only relatively high-quality collateral leaves may limit the scope to lower risk premiums. But, even if the Federal Reserve could take more credit risk onto its balance sheet, any social benefits from the Federal Reserve doing so would need to be balanced against the potentially substantial drawbacks associated with placing the Federal Reserve squarely in the process of allocating credit among private sector borrowers.
O pen M arket O p eration s 3.1 H isto r ic a l O v erv iew
Open market operations were authorized under Section 14 of the original Fed eral Reserve Act, but played a limited role in the conduct of monetary policy until the early 1920s.38 During this initial period, Reserve Banks purchased financial assets to obtain income with which to pay expenses and purchased bankers' acceptances with the additional objective of helping to develop a U.S. market for bankers' acceptances.39 Open market operations also were seen as a tool with which the Federal Reserve could take the initiative in injecting reserves (rather than waiting for member banks to apply for discounts) and in smoothing out market dislocations.40 
P u r c h a sin g D e b t o f th e U .S . G o v e rn m e n t an d o f U .S . F S Is
As shown in 1968 and updated in 1969, 1971, and 1972.48 This list includes 1 4 ( b ) ( 1 ) A l l U . S . T r e a s u r y s e c u r i t i e s a n d s e c u r i t i e s w h i c h a r e f u l l y g u a r a n t e e d b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .
U . S . G o v e r n m e n t O b l i g a t i o n s : 1 4 ( b ) ( 2 ) U . S . a g e n c y s e c u r i t i e s a n d t h o s e s e c u r i t i e s f u l l y g u a r a n t e e d b y U . S . a g e n c i e s .
P r i v a t e S e c t o r D e b t 2 [ s e e t a b l e f o o t n o t e 2 ] :
1 4 ( f i r s t p a r a g r a p h ) 3 [ s e e t a b l e f o o t n o t e 3 ] " . . . c a b l e t r a n s f e r s a n d b a n k e r s ' a c c e p t a n c e s a n d b i l l s o f e x c h a n g e o f t h e k i n d s a n d 1 4 ( b ) ( 1 ) B i l l s , n o t e s , r e v e n u e b o n d s a n d w a r r a n t s u s e d i n a n t i c i p a t i o n o f t a x e s o r a s s u r e d r e v e n u e s . [ F o o t n o t e 3 . T h e p h r a s e "o f t h e k i n d s a n d m a t u r i t i e s ... e l i g i b l e f o r r e d i s c o u n t " m a y a p p l y t o b a n k e r s ' a c c e p t a n c e s a n d b i l l s o f e x c h a n g e o r j u s t t o t h e l a t t e r . obligations issued or guaranteed by certain U.S. financial services institutions (U.S. FSIs).49 In particular, U.S. FSIs issue two types of securities: direct debt obligations and "guaranteed certificates of participation" such as mortgage pass-through certificates, which are guaranteed by the U.S. FSI as to the timely payment of principal and interest.50 A key economic issue regarding open market pur chases of these securities is the extent to which they carry risk or liquidity premiums over Treasury securities, and if these premiums can be lowered by Federal Reserve purchases of these securities. Interest rates on U.S. FSI pass through certificates incorporate risk premiums, but these premiums do not directly reflect the credit risk on the underlying securities in the pools on which the pass-throughs are written. The U.S. FSI issuing the certificates ac cepts that credit risk as part of its guarantee of the timely payment of interest and principal to the holders of the pass-through certificates.51
However, two types of risks could remain in the pass-through certificates. First, there is the risk of prepayments on the underlying securities: Pre payments are passed onto the holders of the pass-throughs and need to be reinvested-predictably at lower interest rates. Second, pass-through certifi cates could carry the risk that the U.S. FSI issuing the certificate will not be able to honor its guarantee of the timely payment of interest and principal. However, there is no such risk for government corporations to the extent that they are backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government. And cur rently, financial markets may perceive little such risk for government-sponsored enterprises, which markets apparently assume are backed implicitly by the U.S. government and which are regulated by a variety of government agencies.52 U.S. FSIs also issue direct debt, and the Federal Reserve may have the authority under Sections 14(b)(1) and 14(b)(2) to purchase this debt in the open market and thereby possibly lower the institution's funding costs. As just noted, these institutions benefit from the actual or perceived backing by the U.S. government, which keeps this default risk relatively low.
If asset prices are influenced by changes in the relative supplies of assets, then Federal Reserve purchases of U.S. FSI direct and guaranteed debt could lower the risk premiums on this debt. Such purchases may be helpful in stimulating aggregate demand even when Treasury rates are at zero.
.P u r c h a sin g S ta te an d L ocal G o v e rn m e n t D e b t
The authority under which the Federal Reserve may purchase debt instruments of state and local governments is contained in Section 14(b)(1) of the Act, giving the Federal Reserve the authority:
To buy and sell, at home or abroad, ... bills, notes, revenue bonds, and warrants with a maturity from date of purchase of not ex ceeding six months, issued in anticipation of the collection of taxes or in anticipation of the receipt of assured revenues by any State, county, district, political subdivision, or municipality in the conti nental United States, including irrigation, drainage, and reclama tion projects.53 53Section 1 of the Act defines "the continental United States" as "the States of the United States and the District of Columbia," thus including Alaska and Hawaii.
Garcia, ed (1973) defines a warrant as:
A short-term obligation of a municipality, or other political subdivision, con stituting part of its floating debt. A warrant is a revenue obligation issued in anticipation of tax collection.
Garcia, ed (1973) describes a municipal warrant, saying:
A municipal warrant may originate as an order given by a municipal official acting under proper authority upon the treasurer of such municipality to pay a certain person, firm, or corporation a certain sum of money or goods or services advanced, and which when presented to the treasurer, cannot be paid for lack of funds. When stamped as follows: "Presented but not paid on account of lack of funds. This warrant bears interest from this date until paid at the rate of [x percent ]" together with the treasurer's signature, the order becomes a warrant.
Woelfel (1994) provides a modern definition of a revenue bond, saying:
Bonds issued by municipalities with principal and interest payable from revenues or income from municipally owned or state-owned plants, toll roads or bridges, or public works, such as water works, electric light and power plant, port authority, railroad, etc. Thus revenue bonds are secured by the property and income of a city-owned or state-owned enterprise. The full faith and credit of the state or municipality, however, are not pledged behind revenue bonds, so such issues are classified as "limited liability" debt of the issuing governmental units.
However, the term "revenue bond" may have had a meaning at the time of the writing of the Act that is different from its current meaning as given above. For example, in editions subsequent to the 1924 edition of Munn (1924), revenue bonds generally were defined as above, but the 1924 edition defines revenue bonds as:
Bonds issued temporarily by a municipality or other civil division in order to provide funds for current expenditure until taxes, or other income due, can be collected. Revenue bonds are usually in the form of short-term notes and payable on the next tax date. They are also known as tax relief or tax arrearage bonds.
Similar to these current and earlier definitions of revenue bonds are the ones used in the 1938 and the 1931 editions of Financial Statistics of the United States (various years), respectively.
Three particular aspects of this authorization are noteworthy. First, this authorization does not limit Federal Reserve purchases of state and local gov ernment debt to the open market. Reserve Banks may purchase such obli gations directly from state or local governments.54 Second, the Act requires only that debt purchased have a maturity of six months or less at the time of purchase by the Federal Reserve, implying that eligible debt may have had a longer original maturity.
Third, the state or local government debt must have been issued " ... in anticipation of the collection of taxes or in anticipation of the receipt of assured revenues." The extent to which this phrase restricts the state and local government debt that may be purchased by the Federal Reserve is unclear. For example, this phrase could render revenue bonds (current definition) ineligible for purchase because the amount of revenue generated by the project financed by the revenue bond might be somewhat uncertain and not be "assured" within the meaning of the Act.
.4 P u r c h a sin g P r iv a te -S e c to r D e b t
As shown in table 2, the statutory provisions governing open market purchases of private-sector debt are contained in Sections 14 and 13(4) of the Act. The most general provision for such purchases is contained in the first paragraph of Section 14, which authorizes the Federal Reserve to:
... purchase and sell in the open market ... cable transfers and bankers' acceptances and bills of exchange of the kinds and matu rities by this Act made eligible for rediscount, with or without the indorsement of a member bank.55
This provision contains three limitations on purchases of private-market debt: (1) only cable transfers, bankers' acceptances, and bills of exchange are eligible for purchase or sale; (2) the bills of exchange (and possibly the bankers' acceptances) must be eligible for rediscount; and (3) the purchases and sales must be done in the open market.
The first limitation restricts the instruments to be one of the three men tioned types.56 The first type of instrument, cable transfers, simply means foreign exchange.57
To define the other two types of instruments (bankers' acceptances and bills of exchange) and to distinguish them from other types of financial instruments, Woelfel (1994) states:
From a legal standpoint, credit instruments may be divided into two classes-promises to pay and orders to pay.58 A promise to pay is a two-party instrument in which party A promises to pay party B-an example of which is a bond. In contrast, an order to pay is a three-party instrument: an order by party A that party B make a payment to party C-an example of which is a personal check (in which case party B is the bank on which the check is drawn).59 For a discussion of how the economic functions and the legal rights and obligations associated with an order to pay (and, in particular, a bill of exchange) differ from those associated with a promise to pay, see the Appendix.
Providing specific examples, Woelfel (1994) lists bankers' acceptances as a type of promise to pay and bills of exchange as a type of order to pay:60
As stated by Fundamentals of Banking: How a Bank Works (1943) (page 353), although an acceptance starts out as a order to pay, it is a promise to pay (a note) because of the act of acceptance-an acceptance is defined as:
... a time draft (bill of exchange) on the face of which the drawee has written the word 'accepted,' .... Thus the instrument becomes a promise to pay.
In this definition, the drawee and the acceptor are the same party, but apparently this need not be the case.
If a bankers' acceptance is not defined as a type of note, then no notes are eligible for purchase under the first paragraph of Section 14 of the Act. Indeed, many authors note the similarities between bankers' acceptances and promissory notes, but do not explicitly say that bankers' acceptances are notes. Bigelow (1928) , page 116, states: "If the acceptance [of a bill of exchange] be general the holder now has an unconditional recourse against at least one party to the instrument, who is bound absolutely to pay; whereas before acceptance his recourse was against conditional parties only, drawer and indorsers. By a general acceptance, therefore, the {drawee becomes, like the maker of a note, an absolute promisor,} and the primary party." (Italics added.) Daniel (1903) states "The effect of the acceptance of a bill is to constitute the acceptor the principal debtor. The bill becomes by the acceptance very similar to a promissory note-the acceptor being the promisor, and the drawer standing in relation of an indorser" (p. 527, vol. 1).
The chief types of promises to pay are promissory notes, trade acceptances, { bank acceptances,} bonds, coupons, and certificates of debt.
The chief types of orders to pay are checks, drafts, { bills of exchange,} money orders, telegraphic transfers, cable transfers, and letters of credit (page 269).61 60 61Italics added. Section 13(2) of the Act gives the Federal Reserve the authority to define the character of paper eligible for discount, which it used to provide the following definitions:
A promissory note ... is defined as an unconditional promise, in writing, signed by the maker, to pay, in the United States, at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in dollars to order or to bearer. A bill of exchange ... is defined as an unconditional order, in writing, addressed by one person to another, other than to a banker as defined under IV(a), signed by the person giving it, requiring the person to whom it is addressed to pay in the United States, at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in dollars to the order of a specified person ... Board (1917) for the definition of promis sory note for the purpose of discounts (p. 154) and for the definition of bill of exchange for the purpose of open market operations (p. 157).
See Third Annual Report of the Federal Reserve
Daniel (1903) defines a letter of credit (used above as an example of an order to pay) as "a letter of request, whereby one person requests some other person to advance money or give credit to a third person, and promises that that he will repay or guarantee the same to the person making the advancement, or accept bills drawn on himself, for the like amount" (p. 820, vol. 2) and "Letters of credit very much resemble bills of exchange in some particulars, but they are not bills" (p. 832, vol. 2).
However, the terms "orders to pay" , "drafts" and "bills of exchange" are virtually synonymous.62 62In defining a bill of exchange, Woelfel (1994) on page 135 states:
The Uniform Commercial Code (Sec. 3-104) provides that a writing which complies with the requirements of that section for any writing to be a nego tiable instrument is a DRAFT (bill of exchange) if it is an order. The terms bill of exchange and draft are used interchangeably, but the former is usually applied to an order to pay arising out of a foreign transaction, while the latter term is more often reserved for domestic transactions. Technically, moreover, a bill of exchange is always a negotiable instrument, whereas a draft may be nonnegotiable. According to the Uniform Commercial Code, a bill of exchange is the same as a draft. Works (1943) uses "bills of exchange" and "drafts" interchangeably in the definitions of these terms (pp. 532 and 539).
Also, Fundamentals of Banking: How a Bank
So the use of the term "bills of exchange" authorizes the purchase of virtually the entire class of orders to pay (subject to other restrictions in the Act), but only one particular type of promise to pay is authorized for purchase under the first paragraph of Section 14-and that is a bankers' acceptance.63 63 A bankers' acceptance is an acceptance that has been accepted by a bank. It is defined as "... a draft [bill of exchange] drawn on a bank and accepted by the bank."See Fundamentals of Banking: How a Bank Works (1943) (p. 355) . See the Appendix below for a discussion of the economic functions and the legal rights and obligations associated bankers' acceptances.
Section 13(2) of the Act gives the Federal Reserve the authority to define the character of paper eligible for discount. In its definition of a bankers' acceptance in 1917, the Federal Reserve did not require the acceptor to be a bank and apparently did not require the acceptor to be the drawee:
A bankers' acceptance .... is a bill of exchange of which the acceptor is a bank or trust company, or a firm, person, company, or corporation engaged in the business of granting bankers' acceptance credits. It should be observed that the Act as finally passed excludes the promissory note, the former leading American credit instrument, from open market pur chase by reserve banks. ... In large part this was due to the feeling that the note, not related to a specific transaction nor necessarily bearing an endorse ment, could be identified only with difficulty and hence involved too many hazards (p. 488).
For a proposed amendment to Section 14 of the Act that would have included notes as eligible for purchase see Congressional Record (1913) , December 19 (p. 1192).
Nor is there any express authorization for the Federal Reserve to purchase equities.
The second limitation imposed on open market operations by the first para graph of Section 14 is that, to be eligible for purchase, the credit instruments must be " ... of the kinds and maturities ... eligible for discount." This phrase clearly does not modify cable transfers.65 However, it is not clear from the text whether this phrase modifies both bankers' acceptances and bills of exchange or only the latter-although the Federal Reserve's interpretation appears to have been that it modifies only the latter.66 66A letter in 1923 from the Board's general counsel stated:
At first glance, it would appear that only bankers' acceptances of the kinds and maturities made eligible for rediscount could be purchased in the open market, but, upon careful consideration of the language of this section, it will be found that the phrase "of the kinds and maturities by this act made eligible for rediscount" qualifies only bills of exchange and does not qualify bankers' acceptances. ... It will be seen, therefore, that Federal reserve banks in their open market transactions are not limited to the purchase of acceptances which, under Section 13, ... Federal reserve banks are authorized to discount. According to the Board's interpretation of Section 14, the only limit upon the open market purchase power of bankers' acceptances by Federal reserve banks is to be found in the rules and regulations of the board, and these are embodied in Regulation B. (See Acceptance, Discount, and Open-Market Purchases of Bankers' Acceptances (1923) (p. 317)).
Reed (1922) cites a letter to him from the Board that also indicates the Federal Reserve held the view that the phrase "of the kinds and maturities by this act made eligible for rediscount" does not qualify bankers' acceptances. This letter states that the Federal Reserve Board:
... has authorized the purchase in the open market by Federal reserve banks of acceptances growing out of the domestic storage of { goods,} although the only acceptances eligible for rediscount as growing out of domestic storage transac tions are those growing out of the storage of { readily marketable staples.} The term "goods" is, of course, more inclusive than the term "readily marketable staples." (Italics added. See Reed (1922) (p. 192).) Hereafter, in this paper, we will assume this interpretation is correct.
In normal circumstances, the restriction that the bills of exchange must be eligible for discount would significantly limit the types of bills of exchange that could be purchased under Section 14. Discounting would be limited to the specific types of bills of exchange eligible for discount under Sections 13(4), 13(6) or 13A of the Act (see table 1) or would be subject to the "real bills" restrictions of Section 13(2), which authorizes the discounting of:
... bills of exchange arising out of actual commercial transactions; that is, ... bills of exchange issued or drawn for agricultural, in dustrial, or commercial purposes ... but such definition shall not include ... bills covering merely investments or issued or drawn for the purpose of carrying or trading in stocks, bonds, or other investment securities, except bonds and notes of the government of the United States.67
But, if the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System found that there were "unusual and exigent circumstances" and at least five governors voted to authorize lending under Section 13(3), the Federal Reserve could discount for IPCs:
notes, drafts and bills of exchange ... indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank.68
If these conditions were met, the bills of exchange eligible for purchase might be expanded from those meeting the "real bills" criteria to those that are "secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank."
However, the Board has not had occasion to interpret the Section 14 lan guage on bills of exchange in light of the current language of Section 13(3) and its restriction of discounts only to IPCs "unable to secure adequate credit ac commodations from other banking institutions." One interpretation would be that, "in unusual and exigent circumstances," the expansion of the authority to purchase bills of exchange beyond those issued for "real bills" purposes may be only for those bills of exchange written by individual IPCs for which the requisite determination that they are unable to secure lending elsewhere has been made. A broader reading might be that the Federal Reserve could ex pand its purchases of bills of exchange to those endorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of a Federal Reserve Bank. As a practical matter, this issue is likely to be resolved only if economic circumstances bring this matter to the fore.
The third limitation is that the purchases must be in the "open market." Currently, the open market restriction could pose a problem because markets for bankers' acceptances and bills of exchange are not very deep. In partic ular, the volume of bankers' acceptances dwindled to about $10 billion as of September 2000.69
However, in "unusual and exigent circumstances," these three limitations might become less binding if the Federal Reserve made known its desire to pur chase bankers' acceptances and bills of exchange. First, private-sector issuance of these instruments might well expand, making the open-market restriction less binding. Second, firms and households might be able to restructure their financing arrangements so their credit instruments meet the criteria for bills of exchange. And third, credit is fungible. Funding secured for "real bills" purposes could free up other funds that could be used to finance activities other than "real bills" activities. 
P u r c h a se s o f G o ld , F oreign E x c h a n g e, a n d F oreign G o v ern m en t O b lig a tio n s
The Federal Reserve receives authorization to purchase and sell gold and for eign exchange in Section 14(a) and the first paragraph of Section 14, respec tively, of the Act. The authorization to purchase and sell foreign exchange is granted by the authority to buy and sell cable transfers. 
"In cid en tal P o w ers" and U sin g O p tion s
As discussed generally in Clouse et al. (2003) and in more detail in Tinsley (1998), the Federal Reserve might, in some circumstances, believe it would be desirable to enter options markets. The legal authority for such actions may stem from the Federal Reserve's "incidental powers" authority and may depend upon both the particular options used and the purposes for which such actions were undertaken.74 Section 4(4), paragraph "seventh" of the Federal Reserve Act authorizes Federal Reserve to:
... exercise by its board of directors, or duly authorized officers or agents, all powers specifically granted by the provision of this Act and such incidental powers as shall be { necessary} to carry on the business of banking within the limitations prescribed by this Act.75
For example, it could be argued that buying or selling options on Treasury se curities in certain circumstances is an "incidental" extension of the purchasing and selling of Treasury securities that the Federal Reserve is clearly authorized to undertake. And in some particular circumstances (such as nominal interest rates at or near zero) entering markets for such options may be "necessary to carry on the business of banking within the limitations prescribed by this Act."
The only occasion on which the Federal Open Market Committee autho rized the purchase or sale of options was the authorization aimed at promoting smooth functioning of money and financing markets near 1999 year-end as the potential for Y2K strains increased. Under this temporary authorization, the Table 3 P r iv a te -S e c to r A ss e ts In elig ib le for P u rch a se and T h o se E ligib le For P u rch a se U n d er C erta in R e str ic tio n s 1 
In usual circumstances
The bills of exchange must meet the "real bills" doctrine but, it seems, bankers' acceptances do not.
In "unusual and exigent" circumstances 
C on clu sion
Currently, the Federal Reserve conducts domestic open market transactions (including repurchase agreements) only in securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S. Treasury or government-sponsored enterprises, and makes loans only to depository institutions. This paper examines the extent to which the Federal Reserve is authorized to expand the scope of its monetary policy operations beyond these current actions.
In usual circumstances, the Federal Reserve has considerable leeway to lend to depository institutions, but a highly constrained ability to lend directly to individuals, partnerships, and corporations (IPCs). The lending to deposi tory institutions can be accomplished through advances (rather than through discounts) secured by a wide variety of private-sector debt instruments. In discounts for depository institutions, the instruments discounted generally are limited to those issued for "real bills" purposes-that is, agricultural, indus trial, or commercial purposes. The Federal Reserve can make loans to IPCs, but, except in unusual and exigent circumstances, the loans must be secured by U.S. Treasury securities or by securities issued or guaranteed by a federal agency.
Also in usual circumstances, the Federal Reserve is authorized to engage in open market operations in gold, foreign exchange, securities issued or guaran teed by the United States or by U.S. agencies, foreign government obligations, and certain obligations of state and local governments.77 The Federal Reserve can also purchase private-sector credit instruments, but these are limited to bankers' acceptances and to bills of exchange that meet certain "real bills" criteria.78 The Federal Reserve Act contains no explicit language authorizing the Federal Reserve to use its open market authority to purchase promissory notes such as corporate bonds, bank loans, mortgages, or credit-card receivables; or to purchase equities.79
In "unusual and exigent" circumstances (and after certain other restrictions are met) the tools of monetary policy can be expanded. In making loans to IPCs, the Federal Reserve would be able to accept a wide variety of privatesector credit instruments as collateral. In open market operations, the Federal Reserve might be able to expand its purchases to include bills of exchange other than those meeting "real bills" criteria.
An important economic issue in both usual and "unusual and exigent" circumstances is whether the Federal Reserve can take onto its balance sheet the credit risk of assets that are purchased or that are used as collateral in loans to depositories or IPCs. Except in unusual and exigent circumstances, it seems to be easier for the Federal Reserve to take (nondepository) credit risk onto its balance sheet in the case of asset purchases than in the case of loans. But even if the Federal Reserve could accept credit risk onto its balance sheet, having the Federal Reserve directly involved in the evaluation of credit risk and influencing the allocation of credit across sectors of the economy would involve its own problems.
Recently, the Federal Reserve has used its "incidental powers" authority to write options contracts on repurchase agreements. However, the use of these powers may depend on the particular options entered into and the particular purpose for which they are entered because the use of this power must be "necessary to carry on the business of banking within the limitations prescribed by the [Federal Reserve] Act." 6 A p p en d ix: B ills o f E xch an ge and B a n k ers' A ccep ta n ces 6.1 B ills o f E x ch a n g e Parsons (1863) discusses three features of a bill of exchange: how it can facili tate transactions, the form it takes, and the rights and obligations associated with it. Regarding how a bill of exchange can facilitate transactions, Parsons states:
The bill of exchange is the principal instrument for the transfer of money from place to place. In this respect, it is greatly superior to the promissory note. But the same result may be obtained [even] more directly and conveniently by means of a bill of exchange. Let the New York debtor, whom we will call A, buy for a thousand pounds in dollars a written order from the New York creditor B, addressed to the London debtor C, requiring him to pay that amount to the order of A. Upon this A indorses an order to C to pay it to his London creditor D, and transmits it to D, who presents it for payment to C, and, receiving his money, both debts are paid (pp. 52-53, Vol. 1).
In terms of the form of a bill of exchange, Parsons states:
Such an order would be a bill of exchange. It would, generally, be in this form. 'New York, January 5, 1857. Value received, please pay to A, or order, one thousand pounds, in sixty days after sight, on account of your obedient servant, B. To C, London.' Here B is the drawer; C is the drawee; A is the payee. As soon as D received the bill, with the order which A indorses upon it making it payable to him, he would, with all convenient promptitude, present it to C; firstly, that the sixty days after sight might begin to run; secondly, that he might know certainly whether C would pay the money as ordered. This presentment, therefore, is called a presentment for acceptance; because C must do one thing or the other, that is, he must accept the bill, and this he usually does by writing across the face of it the word 'Accepted,' with a date, and signing his name below the word; or he must refuse to accept the bill (p. 53, Vol. 1).
Regarding the rights and obligations associated with a bill of exchange (and comparing them with those of a promissory note), Parsons states:
The maker or signer of a promissory note, by signing and delivering it, comes at once under an absolute obligation to pay it according to its tenor to any holder to whom it may be due at maturity; and such holder must look to the maker in the first place, and demand it of him in the manner prescribed by law, before he can look to any other party. Not so with the drawer or signer of a bill of exchange. He too comes under an obligation to pay it; but it is only an obligation to pay it if the drawee, or person whom he orders to pay the money, fails to pay it. For the payee, by receiving this order, undertakes to look to the drawee, and use the methods which the law prescribes to get payment from him. The making and delivery of the bill put the drawee under no obligation whatever beyond those which exist from the relations between him and the drawer. When it is presented to him, he can accept it or not; but if he does accept it, then he comes at once under an absolute obligation to pay the bill according to its tenor. ... The acceptor is bound absolutely to pay the bill; the drawer is bound to pay it if the acceptor does not ... .
[The drawer] is not only bound to pay the bill if the acceptor does not, but he is bound to pay it if the drawee refuses to accept it. By such refusal there is no acceptor, and no person primarily bound to pay it. But that refusal was one of the conditions on which the drawer engages to pay it, because by drawing he engages that the drawee shall accept the bill on presentment. { Therefore if acceptance be refused, the obligation of the drawer may be made absolute at once by due notice} ... Vol . 1, italics added).
Thus, in addition to facilitating "the transfer of money from place to place" , the use of a bill of exchange (rather than a promissory note) also affects the credit risk incurred by the creditor. If the debt transaction had been under taken by means of a 6-month promissory note issued by the New York debtor and held by the London creditor, then the London creditor would be incurring the credit risk of the New York debtor for six months. But with the bill of exchange, the London creditor incurs the credit risk of the New York debtor only until (and if) the London creditor presents the bill of exchange to party C (the drawee) and the bill is accepted by C. Then the London creditor incurs the credit risk of C going forward. Even if the bill of exchange is not accepted by C, the time over which the London creditor incurs the credit risk of the New York debtor still is shortened (relative to the case of a promissory note) In this case, the London creditor can make a demand on the New York debtor for immediate payment (after making protest for nonacceptance) rather than waiting for the full sixty days as would be the case with the promissory note.
B a n k e r s' A c c e p ta n c e s
The above three features of a bill of exchange carry over to a bankers' accep tance (BA), because a BA is merely a "bill of exchange drawn on and accepted by a bank."80 The particular feature of a BA is that the credit risk associated with original bill of exchange is reduced by having the instrument accepted by a bank. The practical significance of the acceptance of a bill of exchange by a bank that enjoys widespread and high credit standing, at least as stated in 1929, is that:
The bank acceptance is an indispensable instrument in foreign trade, where, owing to the distance between buyer and seller, differ ences in legal arrangements and the constant fluctuations if foreign exchange rates, it is particularly necessary that certainty of pay ment shall be free from all doubt, and [, as a result, ] that the obligation shall be readily salable to dealers in foreign exchange.81
